Credit Default Swaps Explained

Definition of Credit Default Swap – CDS are a financial instrument for swapping the risk of debt default. Credit default swaps may be used for emerging market bonds, mortgage-backed securities, corporate bonds and local government bond

  • The buyer of a credit default swap pays a premium for effectively insuring against a debt default. He receives a lump sum payment if the debt instrument defaults.
  • The seller of a credit default swap receives monthly payments from the buyer. If the debt instrument defaults they have to pay the agreed amount to the buyer of the credit default swap.

Example of Credit Default Swap

  • An investment trust owns £1 million corporate bond issued by a private housing firm.
  • If there is a risk the private housing firm may default on repayments, the investment trust may buy a CDS from a hedge fund. The CDS is worth £1 million.
  • The investment trust will pay interest on this credit default swap of say 3%. This could involve payments of £30,000 a year for the duration of the contract.
  • If the private housing firm doesn’t default. The hedge fund gains the interest from the investment bank and pays nothing out. It is simple profit.
  • If the private housing firm does default, then the hedge fund has to pay compensation to the investment bank of £1 million – the value of the credit default swap.
  • Therefore the hedge fund takes on a larger risk and could end up paying £1million

The higher the perceived risk of the bond, the higher the interest rate the hedge fund will require.

Example of Credit Default Swap

  • Example, suppose that Lloyds TSB has lent money to riskymortgage.co.uk in the form of a £1,000 bond.
  • Lloyds TSB may then purchase a credit default swap from another company e.g. a Hedge Fund.
  • If the firm (Riskymortgage.co.uk) default on the loan, then the hedge fund will pay Lloyds TSB the value of the loan.
  • Thus Lloyds TSB has insurance against loan default. The hedge fund has the opportunity to make a profit, so long as the firm does not default on the loan.
  • The riskier the loan, the higher will be the premium required on buying a credit default swap.

Why Would People Buy Credit Default Swaps?

1. Hedge against risk. Suppose an investment fund owned mortgage bonds from riskymortgage.co.uk. It might be worried about losing all its investment. Therefore, to hedge against the risk of default, they could purchase a credit default swap from Lloyds TSB. If riskymortgage.co.uk defaulted, they will lose their investment, but receive a pay-off from Lloyds to compensate. If they don’t default, they have paid a premium to Lloyds but have had security.

2. Speculation e.g. risk is underpriced.

Suppose a hedge fund felt risky mortgage was very likely to default because of a rise in home repossessions. They would buy a credit default swap. If the debt defaulted, then they would make a profit from Lloyds TSB. Note you don’t have to actually own debt to take a credit default swap.

The riskier a bond is the higher premium will be required from a buyer of a credit default swap. It is argued that credit default swaps provide an important role in indicating the riskiness/creditworthiness of a firm.

3. Arbitrage

If a company’s financial position improves, the credit rating should also improve and therefore, the CDS spread should fall to reflect improved rating. This makes CDS more attractive to sell CDS protection. If the company position deteriorated, CDS protection would be more attractive to buy. Arbitrage could occur when dealers exploit any slowness of the market to respond to signals.

Credit Default Swaps in Markets

  • The first credit default swap was introduced in 1995 by JP Morgan. By 2007, their total value has increased to an estimated $45 trillion to $62 trillion. Although since only 0.2% of investment companies default, the cash flow is much lower than this actual amount.
  • The size of the credit default market dwarfs that of the stock market and the bond market they represent. Therefore, this shows that credit default swaps are being used for speculation and not insuring against actual bonds.
  • Credit Default Swaps are unregulated and because they get traded so frequently there is an uncertainty of who owns them and whether the holders can actually pay in the event of a negative credit event.

Credit Default Swaps and Credit Crisis

Some have suggested credit default swaps have exacerbated the financial crisis of 2008. E.g. When Lehman Brother went bankrupt, it meant a lot of credit default guarantees would go unrewarded. E.g. Washington Mutual bought corporate bonds in 2005 and hedged their exposure by buying CDS protection from Lehman brothers. With Lehman brothers going bankrupt this CDS protection was nullified.

Others say that credit default is only an instrument reflecting changes in risk and are not the cause of the underlying liquidity problems

See also:

43 thoughts on “Credit Default Swaps Explained”

  1. “The first credit default swap was introduced in 1995 by JP Morgan. By 2007, their total value has increased to an estimated $45 trillion to $62 trillion. Although since only 0.2% of investment companies default, the cash flow is much lower than this actual amount. The size of the credit default market dwarfs that of the stock market and the bond market they represent.”
    1.) The value of the CDS market has never been anywhere near $45 trillion or $65 trillion. CDS is similar to insurance. If you buy a $100,000 insurance policy on your house, it is not worth $100,000. It’s value is far closer to zero than $100,000. By comparing the amount insured (notional value) to the actual value (i.e. what someone would pay for it) of the stock and/or bond market, you are comparing apples to oranges. The actual value of the CDS market is a small fraction of the stock and/or bond market.
    2.) The notional value itself of the CDS market is overinflated as the same investor often both buys and sells CDS on the same company. Under pressure from the Fed, the industry is rapidly working to tear up these redundant trades. Over $25 trillion of notional value in CDS has been torn up in the last several months with zero change in the last several months (www.lsta.org).

    “Credit Default Swaps are unregulated and because they get traded so frequently there is uncertainty of who owns them and whether the holders can actually pay in the event of a negative credit event.”

    They may be under-regulated but they are not unregulated. Comments by the SEC that CDS is unregulated is part of their effort to expand their powers. Have you seen any comments by the Treasury or the Fed that CDS is unregulated?
    In terms of there being no knowledge of who owns them, DTCC (www.dtcc.com) has started to publish weekly details on the amount of CDS outstanding on the top 1,000 insured entities. DTCC (a regulated entity) handles the cash payments for CDS. They could not do this if they did not know who to pay (i.e. who owns them).

  2. These instruments were worth trillions, and yet they remained unregulated! Nobody is sure who even owns them. The worst aspect, according to your article and others is that nobody is doing any oversight to make sure that the holders can pay as a result of a negative credit event.

    AIG is truly an insurance Giant. They were careful NOT to identify this as “insurance” least they be regulated by the State of New York Insurance authorities.

    Here’s the real bombshell. It’s my understanding that several institutions can buy insurance on the same bond. In fact, I believe that in the majority of this para-insurance most institutions didn’t.

  3. CDS are “hedges against risk”…like insurance, but not regulated like insurance. What could be more risky than unregulated insurance?

  4. May I suggest a clearer definition of a credit default swap using actual businesses. There are articles written that companies such as AIG opened what is considered a “casino” taking actual cash bets on which it appears they lost. Did AIG act like “house” by taking the bets and guaranteeing the bet between two other parties, or were they one of the parties? Two other programs on TV seemed to indicate that it was a cash bet between two parties, and there could be more than one bet on the same situation.

    On AEI on 1/24/09, after Gramm spoke one of the panelists was named Posen. As i understood him these companies weren’t even involved in the shipment of goods, but were placing a side bet in cash. A similar program on 60 Minutes a few months back, as I understood the program, cash bets were placed and bets were lost and it was a lack of reserves. Was AIG placing cash bets or were they guaranteeing a bet between two other parties?

  5. If a CDS buyer does not own the debt being insured, this is gambling – pure and simple. Banks have become bookie agencies and governments are expected to cover their losses. Home equity lenders are blocking the stimulus bills mortgage re-financing. Why is second position with a risky loan better than second position on a much safer loan? My guess, and that is all it is, is that any credit default insurance is not transferable to the new loan? The government should force loan default transferability or invalidate all default insurance on debt not owned by the insurance holder.

  6. It would seem that if you buy a credit default swap on a contract between two other parties, that gambling is evident. The state attorney general in the state where this is happing should bring action against the bookie and the particpants. Cancel all contracts of this type. Arrest all parties and Charge Them with gambling.

  7. It would seem that if you buy a credit default swap on a contract between two other parties, that gambling is evident. The state attorney general in the state where this is happening should bring action against the bookie and the particpants.

  8. The banking and finance committies of both houses have allowed banks, investment banks, hedge funds and other financial institutions to buy, sell, and trade credit default swaps (read that as insurance without proper reserves at best and outright gambling at worst) without a clearing mechanism or regulation. Go look at the campaign contributions of these committee members and see why this has been allowed to happen. The “perfect storm” of artificially low mortgage rates (Greenspan/Fed), loose (or criminally deceptive) mortgage loans, and a housing bubble colapse combined to make CDOs (packages of toxic loans) worthless and all those CDSs based on them just as worthless. Trillions of inflated money evaported. Where did it go? Into the combined pockets of all the people in the chain of guilt! Mortgage brokers, banks, mortgage makers of all kinds, CDS issuers, such as hedge funds, investment institutions(Citi, Lehman’s,JP Morgan), Insurance companies (AIG) each inflating the value as it passed through their hands, politicians paid not to regulate too closely. And we the people for not being committed enough to hold these politicians and CEOs responsible for their greed and not controlling our own greed.

  9. Pingback: Derivatives, How Dangerous are they? | Global Economics, Energy and Investing
  10. Hello,

    There has been much debate in recent days regarding whether the market for “Credit Default Swaps(CDS)” should be more tightly regulated. The market makers are usually big banks who hold a large inventory of Credit Default Swaps.

    Thanks,
    Mark Smith(http://www.healthinsuranceinfo.org/)

  11. Why do we call this thing CDS instead of insurance ? Was it just to confuse the “enemy” by giving it some funny name ? Can you guess how many PhD’s and for how long worked on coming up with the name CDS ?
    They should get another Nobel for their effort
    to make up something completely meaningless
    and incomprehensible. Just say it aloud CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP, you know right away what that means. Right ?

  12. I absolutely agree with jan, I tried to read the explanation from the wikipedia over and ower again, after good hour just understud that it means!!!

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